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Abstract: Security is unarguably the most serious concern for Web applications, to which SQL
injection (SQLi) attack is one of the most devastating attacks. Automatically testing SQLi vul-
nerabilities is of ultimate importance, yet is unfortunately far from trivial to implement. This is
because the existence of a huge, or potentially infinite, number of variants and semantic possibili-
ties of SQL leading to SQLi attacks on various Web applications. In this paper, we propose a deep
natural language processing based tool, dubbed DeepSQLi, to generate test cases for detecting SQLi
vulnerabilities. Through adopting deep learning based neural language model and sequence of words
prediction, DeepSQLi is equipped with the ability to learn the semantic knowledge embedded in SQLi
attacks, allowing it to translate user inputs (or a test case) into a new test case, which is semantically
related and potentially more sophisticated. Experiments are conducted to compare DeepSQLi with
SQLmap, a state-of-the-art SQLi testing automation tool, on six real-world Web applications that are of
different scales, characteristics and domains. Empirical results demonstrate the effectiveness and the
remarkable superiority of DeepSQLi over SQLmap, such that more SQLi vulnerabilities can be identified
by using a less number of test cases, whilst running much faster.
Keywords: Web security, SQL injection, test case generation, natural language processing, deep
learning
1 Introduction
Web applications have become increasingly ubiquitous and important since the ever prevalence of
distributed computing paradigms, such as Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet-of-Things. Yet, they
are unfortunately vulnerable to a variety of security threats, among which SQL injection (SQLi)
has been widely recognised as one of the most devastating threats. Generally speaking, SQLi is an
injection attack that embeds scripts in user inputs to execute malicious SQL statements over the
relational database management system (RDBMS) running behind a Web application. As stated in
the Akamai report1, SQLi attacks constituted 65.1% of the cyber-attacks on Web applications during
November 2017 to March 2019. It also shows that the number of different types of Web attacks (e.g.,
XSS, LFI and PHPi) has ever increased, but none of them have been growing as fast as SQLi attacks.
Therefore, detecting and preventing SQLi vulnerabilities are of ultimate importance to improve the
reliability and trustworthiness of modern Web applications.
There are two common approaches to protect Web applications from SQLi attacks. The first one
is customised negative validation, also known as input validation. Its basic idea is to protect Web
applications from attacks by forbidden patterns or keywords manually crafted by software engineers.
∗This manuscript is accepted for publication in ISSTA 2020. The copyright of this paper has been permanently
transferred to ACM. Li is the corresponding author of this paper. All authors made commensurate contributions to
this paper. Li designed and supervised the research. Liu built the system and carried out experiments. Li and Chen
interpreted data and wrote the manuscript.
1 https://www.akamai.com/
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Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate a comprehensive set of validation rules
that is able to cover all types of attacks. The second approach is prepared statement that allow
embedding user inputs as parameters, also known as placeholders. By doing so, attackers are difficult
to embed SQLi code in user inputs since they are treated as value for the parameter. However, as
discussed in [1] and [2], prepared statement is difficult to design given the sophistication of defensive
coding guideline. In addition, there are many other terms, such as dynamic SQL of DDL statement
(e.g., create, drop and alter) and table structure (e.g, names of columns, tables and schema) cannot
be parameterised.
Test case generation, which build test suites for detecting errors of the system under test (SUT),
is the most important and fundamental process of software testing. This is a widely used practice
to detect SQLi vulnerabilities where test suites come up with a set of malicious user inputs that
mimic various successful SQLi attacks, each of which forms a test case. However, enumerating a
comprehensive set of semantically related test cases to fully test the SUT is extremely challenging, if
not impossible. This is because there are a variety of SQLi attacks, many complex variants of which
share similar SQL semantic. For example, the same attack can be diversified by changing the encoding
form, which appears to be different but is semantically equivalent, in order to evade detection.
Just like human natural language, malicious SQL statements have their unique semantic. There-
fore, test case generation for detecting SQLi vulnerabilities can take great advantages by exploiting
the knowledge from such semantic naturalness. For example, given a Web form with two user input
fields, i.e., username and password, the following SQL statement conforms to a SQLi attack:
SELECT * FROM members WHERE username=‘admin’+OR+‘1’=‘1’ AND password=‘’--’
where the underlined parts are input by a user and constitute a test case that leads to an attack to
the SUT. Given this SQLi attack, we are able interpret some semantic knowledge as follows.
• This is a tautology attack that is able to use any tautological clause, e.g., OR 1=1, to alter the
statement in a semantically equivalent and syntactically correct manner without compromising
its maliciousness.
• To meet the SQL syntax, an injection needs to have an appropriate placement of single quotation
to complete a SQL statement. Therefore, the attack should be written as admin’+ OR+‘1’=‘1.
In addition, the unnecessary part of the original statement can be commented by --.
• In practice, due to the use of some input filters like firewalls, blank characters will highly likely
be trimmed by modern Web applications thus leading to the failure of admin’ OR 1=1 to form a
tautology attack. By replacing those blank characters with +, which is semantically equivalent,
the attacker is able to disguise the attack in a more sophisticated manner.
Although semantic knowledge can be interpreted by software engineers, it is far from trivial to leverage
such knowledge to automate the test case generation process.
Traditional test case generation techniques mainly rely on software engineers to specify rules to
create a set of semantically tailored test cases, either in a manual [3,4] or semi -automatic manner [5–7].
Such process is of limited flexibility due to the restriction of human crafted rules. Furthermore, it is
expensive in practice or even be computationally infeasible for modern complex Web applications.
Recently, there has been a growing interest of applying machine learning algorithms to develop
artificial intelligence (AI) tools that automate the test case generation process [8–11] and [12]. This
type of methods requires limited human intervention and do not assume any fixed set of SQL syntax.
However, they are mainly implemented as a classifier that is used to diagnose whether a SQL statement
(or part of it) is a valid statement or a malicious injection. To the best of our knowledge, none of
those existing AI based tools are able to proactively generate semantically related SQLi attacks during
the testing phase. There have been some attempts that take semantic knowledge into consideration.
For example, [10] developed a classifier that considers the semantic abnormality of the OR phrase
(e.g., OR 1=1 or OR ’i’ in (’g’, ’i’)) in a tautology attack. Unfortunately, this method ignores
other alternatives, which might be important when semantically generating SQLi attacks, to create
tautology (e.g., we can use -- to comment out other code) .
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Bearing the above considerations in mind, this paper proposes a deep natural language process-
ing (NLP) based tool2, dubbed DeepSQLi, which learns and exploits the semantic knowledge and
naturalness of SQLi attacks, to automatically generate various semantically meaningful and mali-
ciously effective test cases. Similar to the machine translation between dialects of the same language,
DeepSQLi takes a set of normal user inputs or existing test case for a SQL statement (one dialect)
and translates it into another test case (another dialect), which is semantically related but potentially
more sophisticated, to form a new SQLi attack.
Contributions. The major contributions of this paper are:
• DeepSQLi is a fully automatic, end-to-end tool empowered by a tailored neural language model
trained under the Trans-former [13] architecture. To the best of our knowledge, this work is
the first of its kind to adopt Transformer to solve problems in the context of software testing.
• To facilitate the semantic knowledge learning from SQL statement, five mutation operators are
developed to help enrich the training dataset. Unlike the classic machine translation where only
the sentence with the most probable semantic match would be of interest, in DeepSQLi, we
extend the neural language model with Beam search [14], in order to generate more than one
semantically related test case based on the given test case/normal inputs that needs translation.
This helps to generate a much more diverse set of test cases, and thus providing larger chance
to find more vulnerabilities.
• The effectiveness of DeepSQLi is validated on six real-world Web applications selected from
various domains. They are with various scales and have a variety of characteristics. The results
show that DeepSQLi is better than SQLMap, a state-of-the-art SQLi testing automation tool, in
terms of the number of vulnerabilities detected and exploitation rate whilst running up to 6×
faster.
Novelty . What make DeepSQLi unique are:
• It is able to translate any normal user inputs into some malicious inputs, which constitute to a
test case. Further, it is capable of translating an existing test cases into another semantically
related, but potentially more sophisticated test case to form a new SQLi attack.
• If the generated test case cannot achieve a successful SQLi attack, it would be fed back to the
neural language model as an input. By doing so, DeepSQLi is continually adapted to create
more sophisticated test cases, thus improving the chance to find previously unknown and deeply
hidden vulnerabilities.
The remaining paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a pragmatic tutorial of neural
language model used for SQLi in this paper. Section 3 delineates the implementation detail of our
proposed DeepSQLi. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results on six real-world Web
applications. Section 5 exploits the threats to validity and related works are overviewed in Section 6.
Section 7 summarises the contributions of this paper and provides some thoughts on future directions.
2 Deep Natural Language Processing for SQLi
In this section, we elaborate on the concepts and algorithms that underpin DeepSQLi and discuss how
they were tailored to the problem of translating user inputs into test cases.
2.1 Neural Language Model for SQLi
Given a sequence of user inputs Iu = {w1, . . . , wN} where wi is the i-th token, a language model
aims to estimate a joint conditional probability of tokens of Iu. Since a direct calculation of this
2 All source code and experiment data can be accessed at our anonymous repository: https://github.com/COLA-
Laboratory/issta2020
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multi-dimensional probability is far from trivial, it is usually approximated by n-gram models [15] as:
P (w1, · · · , wN ) =
N∏
i=1
P (wi|w1, · · · , wi−1)
≈
N∏
i=1
P (wi|wi−n+1, · · · , wi−1)
, (1)
where N is the number of consecutive tokens. According to equation (1), we can see that the prediction
made by the n-gram model is conditioned on its n−1 predecessor tokens. However, as discussed in [16],
n-gram models are suffered from a sparsity issue where it does not work when predicting the first token
in a sequence that has no predecessor.
To mitigate such issue, DeepSQLi makes use of neural language model as its fundamental building
block. Generally speaking, it is a language model based on neural networks along with a probability
distribution over sequences of tokens. In our context, such probability distribution indicates the
likelihood to which a sequence of user inputs conform to a SQLi attack. For example, a sequence of
inputs admin’+OR+‘1’=‘1 will have a higher probability since it is able to conform to a SQLi attack;
whereas another sequence of inputs OR SELECT AND 1, which is semantically invalid from the injection
point of view, will have a lower probability to become a SQLi attack.
Comparing to the n-gram model, which merely depends on the probability, the neural language
model represents the tokens of an input sequence in a vectorised format, as known as word embedding
which is an integral part in neural language model training. Empowered by deep neural networks,
a neural language model is more flexibility with predecessor tokens having longer distances thus is
resilient to data sparsity.
In DeepSQLi, we adopt a neural language model for token-level sequence modeling, given that a
token is the most basic element in SQL syntax. In other words, given a sequence of user inputs Iu,
the neural language model aims to estimate the joint probability of the inclusive vectorised tokens.
2.2 Multi-head Self-Attention in Neural Language Model
Attention mechanisms, which allow modelling of dependencies without regarding to their distance in
sequences, have recently become an integral part of sequence generation tasks [17]. Among them,
self-attention is an attention mechanism that has the ability to represent relationship between tokens
in a sequence. For example, we can better understand the token ”1” in the sequence ”OR 2 > 1”
by answering three questions: ”why to compare (i.e., what kind of attack)”, ”how to compare” and
”who to compare with”. Self-attention have been successfully applied to deal with various NLP tasks,
such as machine translation [13], speech recognition [18] and music generation [19]. In DeepSQLi, the
self-attention is calculated by the scaled dot-product attention proposed by Vaswani et al [13]:
Q = XWQ,K = XWK ,V = XWV
A(Q,K,V) = softmax
(
QKT√
d
)
V
, (2)
where X is the word embedding, i.e., the vector representation, of the input sequence, Q is a matrix
consists of a set of packed queries, K and V are keys and values matrices whilst d is the dimension
of the key. In particular, Q, K and V are obtained by multiplying X by three weight matrices WQ,
WK and WV .
In order to learn more diverse representations, we apply a multi-head self-attention in DeepSQLi
given that it has the ability to obtain more information from the input sequence by concatenating
multiple independent self-attentions. Specifically, a multi-head self-attention can be formulated as:
MA(QX ,KX ,VX) = [A1(Q1,K1,V1)⊗ · · · ⊗Ah(Qh,Kh,Vh)] ·Wa, (3)
where ⊗ is a concatenation operation, Wa is a weight matrix and h is the length of parallel attention
layers, also known as heads. Since each head is a unique linear transformation of the input sequence
representation as queries, keys and values, the concatenation of multiple independent heads enables
the information extraction from different subspaces thus leading to more diverse representations.
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Figure 1: An illustrative working flowchart of the encoder-decoder (Seq2Seq) model in DeepSQLi.
2.3 Encoder-Decoder (Seq2Seq) model
In order to train the neural language model, we adopt Seq2Seq—a general framework consists of an
encoder and a decoder—in DeepSQLi. In particular, Transformer [13] is used to build the Seq2Seq
model in DeepSQLi instead of those traditional recurrent neural network (RNN) [20] and convolutional
neural network (CNN) [21], given its state-of-the-art performance reported in many Seq2Seq tasks.
Fig. 1 shows an illustrative flowchart of the Seq2Seq model in DeepSQLi. The encoder takes a
sequence of vector representations of N tokens, denoted as X = {x1, · · · ,xN}, which embed semantic
information of tokens; whilst the input of the decoder is another sequence of vector representations of
N tokens, denoted as Y = {y1, · · · ,yN}. Note that N is not necessary to be equal to N . The purpose
of this Seq2Seq model is to learn a conditional probability distribution over the output sequence
conditioned on the input sequence, denoted as P (y1, · · · ,yN |x1, · · · ,xN ). As for the example shown
in Fig. 1 where the input sequence is OR 2 > 1 and the output sequence is || True, the conditional
probability is P (|| True|OR 2 > 1).
More specifically, the encoder in the left hand side of Fig. 1 consists of N identical layers, each
of which has a multi-head self-attention mechanism sub-layer and a deep feed-forward neural network
(FFN) sub-layer. The first sub-layer is the multi-head self-attention. As show in Fig. 1, the output of
the multi-head self-attention, calculated by equation (3), is denoted as Z1. It is supplemented with a
residual connection εZ1 to come up with the output N1 after a layer-normalisation. This process can
be formulated as:
N1 = layer-normalisation(Z1 + εZ1). (4)
Afterwards, N1 is fed to the second sub-layer, i.e., a FNN, to carry out a non-linear transformation.
Specifically, the basic mechanism of the FNN is formulated as:
z2 = FFN(n1) = max (0,n1W1 + b1)W2 + b2, (5)
where n1 is a vector of N1. Thereafter, the output of the FNN, i.e., Z2, will be transformed to two
matrices Ke and Ve after being normalized to N2. It is worth noting that Ke and Ve are the output
of the encoder whilst they embed all information of the input sequence ”OR 2 > 1”.
As for the decoder shown in the right hand side of Fig. 1, it takes Ke and Ve output from the
encoder as a part of inputs for predicting a sequence of semantically translated vector representation Y.
The decoder is also composed of a stack of N identical layers, each of which consists of a masked multi-
head self-attention, a multi-head self-attention and a FNN sub-layers. In particular, the computational
process of the multi-head self-attention and the FNN sub-layers is similar to that of the encoder, except
that Ke and Ve are used as the K and V of equation (2) in the multi-head self-attention sub-layer.
As for the masked multi-head self-attention sub-layer, it is used to avoid looking into tokens after
the one under prediction. For example, the multi-head self-attention masks the second token "True"
when predicting the first one "||".
In principle, the Transformer used to do Seq2Seq allows for significantly more parallel processing
and has been reported as a new state-of-the-art. Unlike the RNN, which takes tokens in a sequential
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manner, the multi-head attention computes the output of each token independently, without consid-
ering the order of words. Since the SQLi inputs used in DeepSQLi are sequences with determined
semantics and syntax, it may leads to a less effective modelling of the sequence information without
taking any order of tokens into consideration. To take such information into account, the Transformer
supplements each input embedding with a vector called positional encoding (PE). Specifically, PE is
calculated by sine and cosine functions with various frequencies:
PEi =
{sin(
i
10000 2
de
), · · · , sin( i
10000 2de
de
)}, if i%2 == 0
{cos( i
10000 2
de
, · · · , cos( i
10000 2de
de
)}, if i%2 == 1 , (6)
where de is the dimension of the vector representation, i represents the index of the token in the
sequence. PEi indicates that the sine variable is added to the even position of the token vector whist
the cosine variable is added to the odd position. Thereafter, the output token vector xi is updated
by supplementing PEi, i.e., pi = xi + PEi. By doing so, the relative position between different
embedding can be inferred without demanding costs .
3 End-to-End Testing with DeepSQLi
DeepSQLi is designed as an end-to-end tool, covering all stages in the penetration testing [22]. As
shown in Figure 2, the main workflow of DeepSQLi consists of four steps: training, crawler, test case
generation & diversification and evaluation, each of which is outlined as follows:
Step 1: Training: This is the first step of DeepSQLi where a neural language model is trained by the
Transformer. Agnostic to the Web application, the training dataset can either be summarised
from historical testing repository or, as what we have done in this work, mined from publicly
available SQLi test cases/data. The collected test cases/data would then be paired, mutated
and preprocessed to constitute the training dataset. We will discuss this in detail in Section 3.1.
Step 2: Crawler: Once the model is trained, DeepSQLi uses a crawler (e.g., the crawler of the Burp Suite
project3) to automatically parse the Web links of the SUT (as provided by software engineers).
The major purpose of the crawler is to extract the fields for user inputs in the HTML elements,
e.g., <input> and <textarea>, which are regarded as the injection points for a SQLi attack.
These injection points, along with their default values, serve as the starting point for the neural
language model to generate SQLi test cases.
Step 3: Test Case Generation & Diversification: The neural language model of DeepSQLi is able to gen-
erate tokens with different probabilities leading to a test case. To fully exploit such advantage
for exploring a diverse set of alternative test cases, in the translation phase, we let the neural
language model to generate and explore tokens with the top m probability instead of merely
using only the highest one. This is achieved by Beam search [14], a heuristic that guides the
neural language model to generate m test cases based on the ranked probabilities. This will be
elaborated in detail in Section 3.2.
Step 4: Evaluation: Based on the test cases generated at Step 3, we randomly choose one and fed it
into the SUT for evaluation. In particular, to avoid compromising the SUT, it is equipped
with a proxy, i.e., SQL Parser4, before the RDBMS to identify whether or not a malicious
SQL statement can achieve a successful attack. To improve the chance of detecting different
vulnerabilities, DeepSQLi stops exploring a specific vulnerability once it has been found through
a test case.
It is worth noting that DeepSQLi does not discard unsuccessful test cases which fail to achieve
attacks as identified by the proxy. Instead, they are fed back to the neural language model to serve as
3 https://portswigger.net/burp
4 http://www.sqlparser.com.
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Figure 2: The architecture and workflow of DeepSQLi.
a starting point for a re-translation (i.e., go through Step 3 again). This comes up with a closed-loop
until the test case successfully injects the SUT or the maximum number of attempts is reached. By
this means, DeepSQLi grants the ability to generate not only the standard SQLi attacks, but also those
more sophisticated ones which would otherwise be difficult to create.
3.1 Training of Neural Language Model
DeepSQLi is agnostic to the SUT since we train a neural language model to learn the semantic knowl-
edge of SQLi attack that is independent to an actual Web application. Therefore, DeepSQLi, once
being trained sufficiently, can be applied to a wide range of SUT as the semantic knowledge of SQLi is
easily generalisable. The overall training procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2. In the following subsections,
we further elaborate some key procedures in detail.
3.1.1 Building Training Dataset
In practice, it is possible that the SUT has accumulated a good amount of test cases from previous
testing runs, which can serve as the training dataset. Otherwise, since we are only interested to learn
the SQL semantics for injections, the neural language model of DeepSQLi can be trained with any
publicly available test cases for SQLi testing regardless to the Web applications, as what we have done
in this paper.
Since our purpose is to translate and generate a semantically related test case based on either a
normal user inputs or another test case, the test cases in the training dataset, which work on the same
injection point(s), need to appear in input-output pairs for training. In particular, an input-output
pair (A,B) is valid if any of the following conditions is met:
• A is a known normal user input and B is a test case. For example, https://xxx/id=7 can be
paired with https://xxx/id=7 union select database() .
• A is a test case whilst B is another one, which is different but still conform to the same type of
attack. For example, A is ’ OR 1=1 -- and B is ’ OR 5<7 -- . It is clear that both of them
lead to a semantically related tautology attack.
• A is a test case whilst B is an extended one based on A, thereby we can expect that B is more
sophisticated but in a different attack type. For example, A: ’ OR 1=1; -- can be paired with
B: ’ or 1=1; select group concat(schema name) from information schema. schema"
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Table 1: Description of five mutation operators used in DeepSQLi to enrich the training dataset.
Operators Explanation
Example
Input Output
Predicate
Mutation by using relational predicates without changing the expression’s
logical results. In particular, the relational predicates are {<,>,≤,≥, between, in, like}. and 8>= 56 and‘l’in (‘m’,‘y’)
Unicode Mutation from a character to its equivalent Unicode format. # %23
ASCII Mutation from a character to its equivalent ASCII encoding format. a CHAR(97)
Keywords Confusion of the capital and small letters of keywords in a test case. select seLeCt
Blank Replace the blank character in a test case with an equivalent symbol. or 1 or/**/1
ta; -- , which belongs to a different type of attack, i.e., a piggybacked queries attack extended
from A.
In this work, we manually create input-output test case pairs to build the training dataset based on
publicly available SQLi test cases, such as those from public repositories, according to the aforemen-
tioned three conditions. More specifically, the training dataset is built according to the following two
steps.
Step 1: We mined the repositories of fuzzing test or brute force tools from various GitHub projects5,
given that they often host a large amount of test case data in their library and these data
are usually arranged according to the types of attacks (along with normal user inputs). This
makes us easier to constitute input-output pairs according to the aforementioned conditions. In
particular, it is inevitable to devote non-trivial manual efforts to classifying and arranging some
more cluttered data.
Step 2: When analyzing the mined dataset, we found it is difficult to constitute input-output pairs for
the disguise attack. For example, a test case containing ’ OR 1=1 -- may fail to inject the
SUT due to the existence of the standard input validation. Whereas a successful SQLi attack can
be formulated by simply change ’ OR 1=1 -- to %27%20OR%201=1%20-- , which is semantically
the same but in a different encoding format. This is caused by the rare existence of semantically
similar SQLi attacks based on manipulating synonyms and encoding formats from those public
repositories. To tackle this issue, five mutation operators, as shown in Table 1, are developed to
further exploit the test cases obtained from Step 1. By doing so, we can expect a semantically
similar test case that finally conforms to a disguise attack. In principle, these mutation operators
are able to enrich the test case samples in the training dataset.
3.1.2 Preprocessing Training Dataset
After building the training dataset, we then need to preprocess the data samples by generalisation and
word segmentation to eliminate unnecessary noise in the training data. Notably, unlike classic machine
learning approaches [23] that generalise all the words in a data sample, we only generalise the user
inputs, the table name and column name to unify tokens ”[normal] ”, ”[table] ” and ”[column] ”.
This is because other words and characters, including text-, encoding-, blank characters-, quotes-
transforms, are specifically tailored in a SQLi attack, thereby they should not be generalised. For
example, considering a test case ”admin’%20or%203<7;--" in the training dataset, it is converted
into a sequence as "[’[normal]’, ’’’, ’%20’, ’or’, ’%2’, ’3’, ’<’, ’7’, ’;’, ’--’]" after
the generalisation.
3.1.3 Training the Model
In DeepSQLi, the neural language model is trained under the Transformer architecture. As suggested
by Vaswani et al. [13], a stochastic optimization algorithm called Adam [24], with the recommended
settings of β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.98 and  = 10
−9, is used as the training algorithm.
5 https://tinyurl.com/wh94b8t
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Figure 3: An illustrative example of Beam search with the beam width is 2 and the corpus size is 5,
i.e., the possible SQL tokens to be chosen are "1" , "2" , ">" , "=" and "OR" .
To prevent overfitting, a 10-fold cross validation is applied in the training process with Adam to
optimize the setting of some hyper-parameters, including the number of layers in the encoder and the
decoder, the number of hidden layers and neurons in FNN, as well as the number of heads used in the
self-attention mechanism of the Transformer. In particular, the following loss function is used in the
training process.
L(Y, P (Y|X)) = − logP (y1, . . . ,yp|x1, . . . ,xs)
= −
p∑
t=1
logP (yt|y1, . . . ,yt−1,x1, . . . ,xs)
(7)
The hyper-parameter setting leading to the minimum of the above loss function is chosen to train the
model.
3.2 Test Case Generation & Diversification
Since the goal of the classic machine translation is to identify the most accurate sentence that matches
the semantics, only the tokens with the highest probabilities in the context is of interest. In contrast,
the major purpose of the test case generation in DeepSQLi is to generate as diverse test cases as
possible so that more bugs or vulnerabilities can be identified. In this case, any semantically related
test cases are of equal importance as long as they are likely to find new vulnerabilities. By this
justification, the classic neural language model, which only outputs the test case having the largest
matching probability, is not suitable for DeepSQLi.
To make the generated test cases be more diversified, Beam search [14] is used to extend and guide
the neural language model to generate a set of semantically related test cases. In a nutshell, instead of
only focusing on the most probable tokens, Beam search selects the m most probable tokens at each
time step given all previously selected tokens, where m is the beam width. Afterwards, by leveraging
the neural language model, it merely carries on the search from these m tokens and discard the others.
Figure 3 shows an example when m = 2 and the corpus size is 5. According to the first token ” OR ”
, 2 sequences OR 1 and OR 2 with the highest probability are selected from 5 candidate sequences at
the first time step. Then, the 2 sequences with the highest probability from the 10 possible output
sequences are selected at each subsequent step until the last token in the sequence is predicted. From
the above search process, we can also see that Beam search does not only improve the diversity, but
also amplify the exploration of search space thus improve the accuracy. In DeepSQLi, we set the beam
width as 5, which means that the neural language model creates 5 different test cases for each input.
For example, considering the case when the input is ’ OR 1=1 , then DeepSQLi could generate the
following outputs: ’ OR 5<7 , ’ || 5<7 , ’+OR+1=1 , ’ OR 1=1 , and ’ OR 1=1-- .
In principle, this diversification procedure enables DeepSQLi to find more vulnerabilities since the
output test cases translated from a given test case (or normal user inputs) are diversified.
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4 Evaluation
In this section, the effectiveness of DeepSQLi is evaluated by comparing with SQLmap6, the state-of-
the-art SQLi testing automation tool [25], on six real-world Web applications. Note that SQLmap was
not designed with automated crawling, thus it is not directly comparable with DeepSQLi under our
experimental setup. To make a fair comparison and to mitigate the potential bias, we extend SQLmap
with a crawler, i.e., the Burp Suite project used in DeepSQLi.
Our empirical study aims to address the following three research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: Is DeepSQLi effective for detecting SQLi vulnerabilities?
• RQ2: Can DeepSQLi outperform SQLmap for detecting SQLi vulnerabilities?
• RQ3: How does DeepSQLi perform on SUT with advanced input validation in contrast
to SQLmap?
All experiments were carried out on a desktop with Intel i7-8700 3.20GHz CPU, 32GB memory and
64bit Ubuntu 18.04.2.
4.1 Experiment Setup
4.1.1 Subject SUT
Our experiments were conducted on six SUT7 written in Java and with MySQL as the back-end
database system. All these SUT are real-world commercial Web applications used by many researchers
in this literature, e.g., [26]. In particular, there are two levels of input validation equipped with these
SUT:
• Essential: This level filters the most commonly used keywords in SQLi attacks, e.g., ‘AND ’ and
‘OR ’.
• Advanced: This is an enhanced level8 that additionally filters some special characters, which are
rarely used but can still be part of a SQLi attack, e.g., ‘&& ’ and ‘|| ’.
Table 2 provides a briefing of the SUT considered in our experiments. In particular, these SUT
cover a wide spectrum of Web applications under real-world settings. They are chosen from various
application domains with different scales in terms of the line-of-code (LOC) and they involve various
database interactions (DBIs)9. Furthermore, the number of Servlets and the number of known SQLi
vulnerabilities (dubbed as KV in Table 2) are set the same as the existing study [26]. It is worth
noting that both the number of accessible Servlets and their total amount are shown in Table 2 since
not all Servlets are directly accessible.
To mitigate any potentially biased conclusion drawn from the stochastic algorithm, each experiment
is repeated 20 times for both DeepSQLi and SQLmap under every SUT.
4.1.2 Training Dataset
In our experiments, the dataset used to train DeepSQLi is constituted by SQLi test cases, consisting of a
diverse type of SQLi attacks, collected from various projects in GitHub. We make the training dataset
publicly accessible to ensure that our results are reproducible10. Afterwards, we preprocess the training
dataset by pairing and mutation according to the steps and conditions discussed in Section 3.1.1. In
particular, the number of paired SQLi test case instances is 19,220, all of which can be directly used for
training DeepSQLi. After using the mutation operators, the training dataset is significantly diversified
and the number of training data instances is increased to 56,841.
6 http://SQLmap.org/.
7More detailed information can be found at http://examples.codecharge.com.
8This level is usually switched off, because more advanced security mechanism can often make the performance of
Web application worse off.
9 The number of SQL statements that can access user inputs.
10 https://tinyurl.com/wh94b8t
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Table 2: Real-world SUT used in our experiments.
SUT LOC Servlets∗ DBIs KV
Employee 5,658 7 (10) 23 25
Classifieds 10,949 6 (14) 34 18
Portal 16,453 3 (28) 67 39
Office Talk 4,543 7 (64) 40 14
Events 7,575 7 (13) 31 26
Checkers 5,421 18 (61) 5 44
∗ The # of accessible Servlets (the total # of Servlets).
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Figure 4: Ratio of # of vulnerabilities identified by DeepSQLi to that of SQLmap.
4.1.3 Quality Metrics
The following three quality metrics are used in our empirical evaluations.
• Number of vulnerabilities found: We use the number of SQLi vulnerabilities identified by
either DeepSQLi or SQLmap as a criterion to evaluate their ability for improving the security of
the underlying SUT.
• Number of test cases and exploitation rate (ER): In order to evaluate the ability for
utilising computational resources, we keep a record of the total number of test cases generated
by either DeepSQLi or SQLmap, denoted as Ttotal. In addition, we also chase the number of test
cases that successfully lead to SQLi attacks, denoted as Tsuccess. Thereafter, ER is the ratio of
Tsuccess to Ttotal, i.e.,
Tsuccess
Ttotal
.
• CPU wall clock time: In order to evaluate the computational cost required by either DeepSQLi
or SQLmap, we keep a record of the CPU wall clock time used by them for testing the underlying
SUT.
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Table 3: Examples of inputs and outputs of DeepSQLi
Example 1
Input SELECT card type id FROM card types WHERE card type name=‘ and+1=(select count(*) from );-- ’;
Output SELECT card type id FROM card types WHERE card type name=‘ ’and+1=(select count(*) from ); -- ’;
Example 2
Input SELECT category id, name, par category id FROM categories WHERE category id= and 3=4 ;
Output SELECT category id, name, par category id FROM categories WHERE category id= and ‘‘7 ;
Input SELECT category id, name, par category id FROM categories WHERE category id= and ‘‘9 ;
Output SELECT category id, name, par category id FROM categories WHERE category id= and%208=9 ;
Example 3
Input SELECT category id, name, par category id FROM categories WHERE category id= 2;
Output SELECT category id, name, par category id FROM categories WHERE category id= 2;delete from members;
Example 4
Input SELECT id, level FROM members WHERE member login =‘’%20||%20‘h ’=‘h ’AND member password=‘’# ’;
Output SELECT id, level FROM members WHERE member login =‘’%20Or%20‘h’=‘h ’AND member password=‘’-- ’;
Example 5
Input
INSERT INTO members (member login,member password,name,email,location,work phone,home phone)
VALUES ("select database()",""test",""test",""test",""test",""1","1") ;
Output
INSERT INTO members (member login,member password,name,email,location,work phone,home phone)
VALUES ("sElEct* database()","test","test","test","test","1","1") ;
4.2 The Effectiveness of DeepSQLi
In this section, we firstly examine DeepSQLi on SUT with the essential input validation. Fig. 4
presents the ratio of the average number of vulnerabilities identified by DeepSQLi (over 20 runs) to
that of known vulnerabilities. From this result, we can clearly see that DeepSQLi is able to identify all
known SQLi vulnerabilities for 5 out 6 SUT, except the Events. This might be caused by the crawler
which fails to capture all injection points in Events. In contrast, it is worth noting that DeepSQLi is
able to identify more SQLi vulnerabilities than those reported in [27] for Office Talk and Checker. This
is a remarkable result that demonstrates the ability of DeepSQLi for identifying previously unknown
and deeply hidden vulnerabilities of the underlying black-box SUT.
To further understand why DeepSQLi is effective for revealing the SQLi vulnerabilities, Table 3
shows the injectable SQL statements and the related test cases generated in our experiments. Specifi-
cally, in Example 1, DeepSQLi is able to learn that the input test case, which is an unsuccessful SQLi
attack, has failed due to a missing quotation mark. Thereby, it generates another semantically related
test case which did find a vulnerability. In Example 2, we see more semantically sophisticated amend-
ments though exploiting the learned semantic knowledge of SQL: the initially failed test case and 3=4
is translated into another semantically related one, i.e., and‘‘9 , which failed to achieve an attack
again. Subsequently, in the next round, DeepSQLi then translates it into a more sophisticated and
successful test case and%208=9 , which eventually leads to the discovery of a vulnerability. Likewise,
for Examples 3 to 5, the input test cases have been translated into another semantically related and
more sophisticated test cases.
Answer to RQ1: Because of the semantic knowledge learned from previous SQLi at-
tacks, DeepSQLi has shown its effectiveness in detecting SQLi vulnerabilities. It is worth
noting that DeepSQLi is able to uncover more vulnerabilities that are deeply hidden and
previously unknown in the SUT.
4.3 Performance Comparison Between DeepSQLi and SQLmap
Under the SUT with the essential input validation, Table 4 shows the comparison results of the total
number of test cases generated by DeepSQLi and SQLmap (dubbed as #total) versus the amount of test
cases leading to successful attacks (dubbed as #success). From these results, it is clear that DeepSQLi
is able to fully test the SUT with fewer test cases than SQLmap. In addition, as demonstrated by the
better ER values achieved by DeepSQLi, we can conclude that DeepSQLi is able to better utilise test
resources.
To have an in-depth analysis, Fig. 5 uses violin charts to visualise the distribution of the number
of SQLi vulnerabilities identified by DeepSQLi and SQLmap on all six SUT across 20 runs. From this
comparison result, it is clear that DeepSQLi is able to find more vulnerabilities than SQLmap at all
instances. In particular, as shown in Fig. 5, the violin charts of DeepSQLi experienced much less
variance than that of SQLmap. This observation implies that it is capable of producing more robust
results by learning and leveraging the semantic knowledge embedded in the previous SQLi test cases.
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Table 4: Comparison results of the # of total/successful test cases generated by DeepSQLi and SQLmap,
and the ER values.
SUT
DeepSQLi SQLmap
#total/#success ER #total/#success ER
Employee 5563/473 8.50% 34851/1534 4.40%
Classifieds 4512/340 7.54% 25954/1046 4.03%
Portal 8657/740 8.55% 63001/2244 3.56%
Office Talk 2998/260 8.67% 9451/462 4.89%
Events 5331/487 9.14% 32136/1440 4.48%
Checkers 13463/1077 8.00% 67919/3352 4.94%
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Figure 5: Violin charts of the number of SQLi vulnerabilities identified by DeepSQLi (black lines) and
SQLmap (gray lines) on six SUT with essential input validation across 20 runs.
Table 5: Comparison of the CPU wall clock time (in second) used to run DeepSQLi and SQLmap over
all 20 runs.
SUT DeepSQLi SQLmap
Employee 355 1177
Classifieds 236 931
Portal 357 2105
Office Talk 166 384
Events 259 1094
Checkers 519 2228
Table 5 shows the comparison results of the CPU wall clock time required for running DeepSQLi
and SQLmap. From this comparison result, we find that DeepSQLi runs much faster than SQLmap. In
particular, it achieves up to 6× faster running time at the SUT Portal. By cross referencing with
the results shown in Table 4, we can see that SQLmap generates much more test cases than DeepSQLi.
It is worth noting that more test cases do not indicate any better contribution for revealing SQLi
vulnerabilities, because those test cases might be either unsuccessful or redundant as reflected by the
lower ER values achieved by SQLmap. In addition, generating a much higher number of (useless) test
cases makes SQLmap much slower than DeepSQLi.
Answer to RQ2: DeepSQLi is able to find significantly more SQLi vulnerabilities than
SQLmap, with a better utilization of the testing resource as evidenced by the better ex-
ploitation rates. DeepSQLi also runs much faster than SQLmap on up to 6× better.
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Figure 6: Violin charts of the number of SQLi vulnerabilities identified by DeepSQLi (black lines) and
SQLmap (gray lines) on SUT with advanced input validation across 20 runs.
Employee
Classifieds
Portal
Office Talk
Events
Checkers
0
10
20
30
40
50 DeepSQLi
SQLmap
Nu
mb
er
 o
f 
Re
du
ct
io
ns
Figure 7: Violin charts of the number of reductions of SQLi vulnerabilities identified by DeepSQLi
(black lines) and SQLmap (gray lines) on SUT with advanced input validation across 20 runs.
4.4 Performance Comparison Between DeepSQLi and SQLmap on SUT with Ad-
vanced Input Validation
The previous subsections have validated the effectiveness and performance of DeepSQLi on SUT with
essential input validation. In this subsection, we switch on the advanced input validation in the SUT,
aiming to assess the performance of DeepSQLi against SQLmap under more complicated and challenging
scenarios.
Fig. 6 presents the comparison results for the number of SQLi vulnerabilities found by DeepSQLi
and SQLmap on SUT under advanced input validation. As can be seen, DeepSQLi finds remarkably
more SQLi vulnerabilities than SQLmap. It is worth noting that there are a few runs where SQLmap
failed to detect any vulnerability at Employee, Classifieds and Office Talk. In contrast, DeepSQLi
shows consistently better performance for finding considerably more SQLi vulnerabilities.
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of DeepSQLi and SQLmap to the strength of input validation,
we compare the number of vulnerabilities found on SUT under advanced input validation with that
on SUT under essential input validation. By cross referencing Fig. 4, we can observe some reductions
on the number of vulnerabilities identified by both tools, as shown in Fig. 7. However, in contrast to
SQLmap, it is clear that DeepSQLi is much less affected by the strengthened input validation in 5 out
of 6 SUT, demonstrating its superior capability of revealing SQLi vulnerabilities in more complicated
scenarios. This better result achieved by DeepSQLi can be attributed to the effective exploitation of
the semantic knowledge learned from previous SQLi test cases [28–58].
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Answer to RQ3: Under the advanced input validation, DeepSQLi leads to much better
results than that of SQLmap, which can hardly find any vulnerability at all in a consider-
able number of runs. In general, DeepSQLi is much less affected by the Web applications
with strengthened input validation.
5 Threats to Validity
As with any empirical study, the biases from the experiments can affect the conclusion drawn. As a
result, we study and conclude this work with the following threats to validity in mind.
The metrics and evaluation method used is a typical example of the construct threats, which
concern whether the metrics/evaluation method can reflect what we intend to measure. In our work,
the metrics studied are widely used in this field of research [59,60] and they serves as quality indicator
for different aspects of SQLi testing. To mitigate the randomness introduced by the training, we
repeat 20 experiment runs for each tool under a SUT. To thoroughly report our results without
losing information, the distributions about the number of SQLi vulnerability found, which is the most
important metric, have also been plotted in violin charts.
Internal threats are concerned with the degree of control on the studies, particularly related to
the settings of the deep learning algorithm. In our work, the hyperparameters of Transformer are
automatically tuned by using Adam and 10-fold cross validation, which is part of the training. The
internal parameters of Adam itself were configured according to the suggestions from Vaswani et al. [13].
The crawler and proxy DeepSQLi are also selected based on their popularity, usefulness and simplicity.
External threats can be linked to the generalisation of our findings. To mitigate such, firstly,
we compare DeepSQLi with a state-of-the-art tool, i.e., SQLmap. This is because SQLmap is the most
cost-effective tool and has been widely used as a baseline benchmark [7, 59, 61]. Secondly, we study
six real-world SUT that are widely used as standard benchmarks for SQLi testing research [26,27,62].
Despite that all the SUT are based on Java, they come with different scales, number of vulnerabilities
and the characteristics, thus they are representatives of a wide spectrum of Web applications. In future
work, we aim to evaluate DeepSQLi on other Web applications developed in different programming
languages.
6 Related Work
In order to detect and prevent SQLi attacks, different approaches have been proposed over the last
decade, including anomalous SQL query matching, static analysis, dynamic analysis, etc.
Several approaches aim to parse or generate SQLi statements based on specific SQL syntax. For
example, Halfond and Orso [27] proposed AMNESIA, a combination of dynamic and static analysis
approach. At the static analysis stage, models of the legitimate queries that applications can generate
is automatically built. In the dynamic analysis phase, AMNESIA uses runtime monitoring to check
whether dynamically generated queries match the model. Mao et al. [63] presented an intention-
oriented detection approach that converted SQL statement into a deterministic finite automaton and
detect SQL statement to determine if the statement contains an attack. These aforementioned ap-
proaches, unlike DeepSQLi, heavily rely on fixed syntax or source code to estimate unknown attacks.
In addition, they are not capable of learning the semantic knowledge from the SQL syntax.
Among other tools, BIOFUZZ [59] and µ4SQLi [64] are black-box and automated testing tools that
bear some similarities to DeepSQLi. However, they have not made the working source code publicly
available or the accessible code is severely out-of-date, thus we cannot compare them with DeepSQLi
in our experiments. Instead, here we qualitatively compare them in light with the contributions of
DeepSQLi:
• BIOFUZZ [59] is a search-based tool that generates test cases using context-free grammars based
fitness function. However, as the fitness function is artificially designed based solely on prior
knowledge, it is difficult to fully capture all possible semantic knowledge of SQLi attacks. This
is what we seek to overcome with DeepSQLi. Further, the fact that BIOFUZZ relies on fixed
grammars may also restrict its ability to generate semantically sophisticated test cases.
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• µ4SQLi [64] is an automated testing tool that uses mutation operators to modify the test cases,
with a hope of finding more SQLi vulnerabilities. However, these mutation operators are designed
with a set of fixed patterns, thus it is difficult to generate new attacks that have not been captured
in the patterns. In DeepSQLi, we also design a few mutation operators, but they are solely used
to enrich the training data, which would then be learned by the neural language model. In this
way, DeepSQLi is able to create attacks that have not been captured by patterns in the training
samples.
SQLMap is used as state-of-the-art in the experiments because it is a popular and actively main-
tained penetration SQLi testing tool, which has been extensively used in both academia [7, 59, 61]
and industry [25]. Here we also make a qualitative comparison of differences between SQLMap and
DeepSQLi.
• SQLMap relies on predefined syntax to generate test cases. Such practice, as discussed in the paper,
cannot actively learn and search for new SQLi attacks, as the effectiveness entirely depends on
the manually crafted rules, which may involve errors or negligence. On the other hand, DeepSQLi
learns the semantics from SQL statements and test cases. Such a self-learning process allows
it to generalize to previously unforeseen forms of attacks. Our experiments have revealed the
superiority of DeepSQLi in detecting the SQLi vulnerabilities.
• SQLMap generates new test cases from scratch. DeepSQLi, in contrast, allows intermediately
unsuccessful, yet more malicious test cases to be reused as the inputs to generate new one. This
enables it to build more sophisticated test cases incrementally and is also one of the reasons that
leads to a faster process of DeepSQLi over SQLMap.
Recently, the combination of machine learning and injection-based vulnerability prevention has
become popular [23] [10] [10] [7] [8]. Among others, Kim et al. [9] used internal query trees from the
log to train a SVM to classify whether an input is malicious. Sheykhkanloo et al. [10] trained a neural
network with vectors which assigned for attacks to classify SQLi attacks. Appelt et al. [7] presented
ML-Driven, an approach generates test cases with context-free grammars and train a random forest
to detect SQLi vulnerability as the software runs. Jaroslaw et al. [8] applied neural networks to detect
SQLi attacks. Their purpose is to build a model that learns the normal input and predicts whether
the next input of user is malicious or not.
Unlike DeepSQLi, none of the work aims to generate SQLi test cases for conducting end-to-end
testing on the Web application. Moreover, DeepSQLi leverages deep NLP to explicitly learn the
semantic knowledge of the SQL for generating the whole sequence of SQLi test case. In particular,
DeepSQLi translates the normal user inputs into test cases, which, when fail, would then be re-entered
into DeepSQLi to generate more sophisticated SQLi attacks.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
SQLi attack is one of the most devastating cyber-attacks, the detection of which is of high importance.
This paper proposes DeepSQLi, a SQLi vulnerability detection tool that leverages on the semantic
knowledge of SQL to generate test cases. In particular, DeepSQLi relies on the Transformer to
build a neural language model under the Seq2Seq framework, which can be trained to explicitly learn
the semantic knowledge of SQL statements. By comparing DeepSQLi with SQLmap on six real-world
SUT, the results demonstrate the effectiveness of DeepSQLi and its remarkable improvement over the
state-of-the-art tool, whilst still being effective on Web applications with advanced input validation.
In future work, we will extend DeepSQLi with incrementally updated neural language model by
using the generated test cases as the testing runs. Moreover, expanding DeepSQLi to handle other
vulnerabilities, e.g., Cross-site Scripting, is also within our ongoing research agenda.
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